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ABSTRACT    
Background 
Impairments of contextual processing and Theory of Mind (ToM) have both been offered as 
accounts of the deviant language characterising formal thought disorder (FTD) in 
schizophrenia. This study investigated these processes in patients’ dialogue. We predicted 
that FTD patients would show a decrement in linguistic alignment, associated with impaired 
ToM in dialogue.  
Methods 
Speech samples were elicited via participation in an interactive computer-based task and a 
semi-structured interview to assess contextual processing abilities and ToM skills in dialogue, 
respectively, and from an interactive card-sorting task to measure syntactic alignment. 
Degree of alignment in dialogue and the syntactic task, and evidence of ToM in (i) dialogue 
and (ii) a traditional ToM task were compared across schizophrenia patients with FTD 
(n=21), non-FTD patients (n=22), and healthy controls (n=21).  
Results  
FTD patients showed less alignment than the other two groups in dialogue, and than healthy 
controls on the syntactic task. FTD patients showed poorer performance on the ToM task 
than the other two groups, but only compared to the healthy controls in dialogue. The FTD 
group’s degree of alignment in dialogue was correlated with ToM performance in dialogue 
but not with the traditional ToM task or with syntactic alignment.  
Conclusions 
In dialogue FTD patients demonstrate an impairment in employing available contextual 
information to facilitate their own subsequent production, which is associated with a ToM 
deficit. These findings indicate that a contextual processing deficit impacts on exploiting 
representations via the production system impoverishing the ability to make predictions about 
upcoming utterances in dialogue. 
 
 


























Approximately 16% of patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia exhibit formal thought 
disorder (FTD) (Andreasen, 1979b), a symptom representing problems of language and 
communication (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). FTD is, however, a notoriously 
heterogeneous symptom, where large variations in the efficiency of communicative 
behaviours through speech are observed (Andreasen, 1982).  
 
FTD as a linguistic impairment  
One account of FTD proposes that it is the result of hyperactivity in the semantic network 
(Manschreck et al., 1988; Spitzer et al., 1993). Automatic semantic priming appears to be 
stronger in FTD, specifically in the earlier or automatic stages of semantic activation (see 
Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008 for a meta-analysis). Alternatively, FTD may be a result of 
abnormalities in the building up and use of context (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992). 
Abnormalities in sensitivity to linguistic context have been documented on both behavioural 
measures (Truscott 1970; Dwyer et al., 2014a; Kuperberg et al., 1998; Dwyer et al., 2014b; 
Kuperberg et al., 1998; Kuperberg et al., 2000; Kuperberg et al., 2006a) and in Event Related 
Potentials (ERP) studies (see Wang, et al., 2011 for a meta-analysis). People with 
schizophrenia do not demonstrate the reduction in the amplitude of the N400 that is reliably 
observed in healthy controls when a word is preceded by a semantically supportive context 
(see Kutas and Federmeier, 2011, for a review).  
However, these may not be incompatible accounts of FTD. Evidence of a processing 
bias for semantic associations driving impairments in contextual processing in schizophrenia 
(both non-FTD and FTD patients) has been found in studies investigating the resolution of 
lexical ambiguity in congruous, incongruous or biasing contexts (Titone, et al., 2000;  
(Sitnikova, et al., 2002; see Kuperberg, et al., 2007 for a review). These findings suggest an 
impairment in suppressing contextually inappropriate meanings and a dependence on lexical 
semantic associations together compromising the building of the whole sentence context. 
 
An integrated theory of language production and comprehension 
The relationship between contextual processing impairments during comprehension and the 
deviant language production seen in FTD remains unclear. Research into FTD has focussed 
primarily on these as unrelated independent processes. However, there is considerable 
evidence of the inter-related nature of these acts, including their recruitment of strongly 
overlapping neural circuits (Scott and Johnsrude, 2003; Wilson, et al., 2004), engagement of 
the production system during speech perception (e.g. Scott, et al., 2009; Silbert, et al., 2014; 
Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010), and evidence that prediction during comprehension engages 
production processes (e.g. Federmeier, 2007; Martin, et al., 2018).  
Pickering and Garrod (2013) invoke a theory of forward modelling in action and 
action perception (e.g. Davidson and Wolpert, 2005; Wolpert, 1997) to explain the 
relatedness of these processes. In this prediction-based account, the listener uses the same 
mechanisms used in production to make predictions about the speakers’ upcoming utterances. 
Firstly, the listener exploits contextual information to determine the speaker’s intention and 
then to predict what she would say. The listener imitates the speaker’s utterance as it unfolds 
and then uses the inverse model and context to derive the production command that the 
listener would use if she were to produce the speaker’s utterance. These representations are 
then exploited to make predictions about upcoming utterances that the speaker will make, and 
so on. In constructing a representation corresponding to the speaker’s utterance, the listener 
aligns her linguistic representations with the speaker along with a representation 
corresponding to what she predicts the speaker will say next. Such alignment increases the 




it is more efficient to re-employ previously activated elements. If the speaker and the listener 
are successful, they will produce similar predictions about the speaker’s upcoming utterance, 
leading to well-coordinated communication. Thus, alignment is facilitated by emulation and 
prediction during comprehension using the production system (Garrod & Pickering, 2013). 
This mirroring is widely observed in dialogue at various levels of structure (See Pickering 
and Garrod 2013 for an overview). 
An imbalance in the mechanisms involved in the building of whole sentence context 
would be expected to result in poverty of alignment in patients’ output. We carried out a 
study of alignment in FTD, non-FTD patients’ and healthy controls’ contributions in 
dialogue. We hypothesized that the FTD group would produce poor alignment, demonstrating 
failure to utilise the available linguistic context and update their interpretation of the 
discussion via the production system. 
 
Theory of mind in schizophrenia  
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the capacity to attribute and understand others’ mental states. 
Impairment of ToM is a consistent finding within schizophrenia research (see Sprong, et al., 
2007 for a meta-analysis and Brüne, 2005; Harrington, et al., 2005a,b for systematic reviews) 
at both the level of a ‘state’ and  ‘trait’ (see Bora, et al., 2009; Bora and Pantelis, 2013 for 
meta-analyses). Psychotic speech may reflect a specific problem of ToM (Frith, 1992; Hardy-
Bayle, 1994). Impoverished contextual processing could also impair the ability to collate the 
contextual information necessary to build up an interpretation of the interlocutor’s mental 
state (Schenkel, et al., 2005).  
The only study of alignment in schizophrenia to date found evidence of preserved 
alignment in FTD in the presence of impaired ToM (Stewart, et al., 2008). These authors 
proposed that alignment facilitates patients’ successful conversation, obviating intensive 
modelling of the interlocutor’s mental state. Yet, studies analysing ToM in dialogue have 
demonstrated preserved ToM abilities in schizophrenia (Stewart, et al., 2009; McCabe, et al., 
2004). The inconsistency in findings across ToM studies could be attributed to a difference 
between explicit reasoning skills and implicit skills required in dialogue (Frith, 2004). 
Explicit reasoning skills as measured by traditional ToM tasks require processing complex 
sentential structure (e.g. Mary thinks that Billy thinks that…) (De Villars, 2005). Problematic 
is that explicit reasoning places demands upon a range of executive functions known to be 
impaired in schizophrenia, e.g. working memory, sustained attention and sequencing (e.g. 
Docherty and Gordinier, 1999; Doherty, 2005; Lee and Park, 2005),which have been found to 
be strongly associated with FTD (Kerns and Berenbaum, 2002). 
We compared patients’ ToM performance on a traditional ToM task and in natural 
dialogue. We hypothesised that FTD patients would show a relative decrement in ToM in 
natural dialogue as a result of contextual processing problems. We further hypothesised this 
would result in a correlation between poverty of alignment and ToM performance.  
 
METHODS 
Participants   
Forty-three patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) were recruited from inpatient wards in London and Cambridge. All 
clinical participants were chronic patients who were stable on typical and atypical 
antipsychotic medication. Twenty-one healthy controls were recruited from a local Job 
Centre, and from non-academic posts at University College London. Inclusion criteria for all 
participants were: age between 18 and 65 years, no self-reported history of brain injury, 




consent was obtained from all participants. The study was approved by the relevant clinical 
research ethical committees (Ref: 06/Q0706/86). 
The Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984) was 
administered to clinical participants. Recordings from SAPS interviews were used to derive a 
positive FTD score with the version of Andreasen’s Thought Language and COmmunication 
(TLC) scale in the Comprehensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH; Andreasen 
et al., 1992). Description of tests and the procedure used to calculate FTD scores are in the 
supplementary materials. The two patient groups did not differ on global scores for delusions 
or hallucinations (see Table 1). 
The three groups differed in terms of current and pre-morbid IQ, and working 
memory function. The two patient groups only differed on premorbid IQ, and all other 
differences were between the patients and healthy controls. Description of tests used to 
calculate the various variables are in the supplementary material 1. Participants’ demographic 
and clinical characteristics are presented in Table 1.   
 
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE - 
 
Materials and procedures  
Alignment in dialogue (the maze task). 
Garrod and Anderson’s (1987) maze game was reproduced with permission (see Garrod and 
Anderson (1987) for a full description of the task). An illustration of the maze can be found 
in the supplementary material 2. In this study the experimenter (K.D.) and participant were 
each seated in front of a laptop displaying a maze configuration. Each player had different 
starting points and different destinations. The aim of the task was for each player to get to 
their destination by taking turns to move through the maze one box at a time. Each maze had 
locked gates, which were controlled by the other player. This required cooperation between 
the two players. Previous studies have shown that players achieve this by aligning in their 
descriptions of the mazes (Garrod and Andersen, 1987; Garrod and Doherty, 1994; Garrod 
and Clark, 1993).  
Each participant played 3 x 10 minute games against the experimenter. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, the experimenter used a confederate script technique to ensure consistent 
descriptions of the maze were provided to participants across the three groups. The 
experimenter provided location descriptions if requested by the participant, or when 
cooperating with the participant to negotiate unlocking gates. The experimenter requested the 
participant’s location if the participant requested her cooperation, or if the experimenter 
required assistance because she was otherwise unable to move. The dialogue between the two 
players was recorded to allow for scoring of alignment.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Syntactic alignment. 
This syntactic priming task was adapted from Branigan, Pickering and Cleland (2000) 
with permission. The task comprised 12 experimental items cards and 36 filler cards. Each 
card depicted a scene involving a finite set of recurring characters e.g. doctor, cowboy, as 
agents performing an action towards either an inanimate object or another character (see 
supplementary material 3). The naïve participant and the confederate each had two sets of 
cards; a description set, and a duplicate of their partner’s description set. Both the 
experimenter and the participant took it in turns to describe their pictures, while the other 




in an 8 x 6 grid formation. Participants were asked to provide a description of their 
illustrations using the verb indicated on the bottom of the card.  
Each experimental item consisted of a pair of picture cards (the card prime described 
by the experimenter and the participant’s experimental card). Each of the experimental items 
cards was a ditransitive verb (e.g. The cowboy handing the ballerina a cake) and involved an 
agent, patient and beneficiary. These cards depicted the ditransitive verbs1 give, hand, offer, 
sell, show and throw a total of twice. These pictures could be described according to two 
possible word order rules in English depending on the order of the complements following 
the verb, e.g. ‘the soldier gave [the ballerinaNP] [a gunNP]’ or ‘the soldier gave [a gunNP] [to 
the ballerinaPP]’. The filler cards depicted 18 transitive verbs a total of twice each. The target 
verb was printed on the bottom of each card.  
The participants were unaware that the confederate had a script of descriptions for the 
prime cards. The confederate’s prime preceded the participant’s prime card for each of the 12 
experimental cards. There were two different orders of cards, according to the structure of the 
complements described by the experimenter (i.e. [the ballerinaNP] [a gunNP]’ or ‘[a gunNP] 
[to the ballerinaPP]’. These were counterbalanced across participants.  While the verbs on the 
prime cards and the target cards differed, they were always ditransitive verbs. This is because 
we were interested in the syntactic structure that the participants’ would use in their 
descriptions of target items. We calculated the number of times the participants’ description 
of the ditransitive target consisted of the same syntactic structure (i.e. either NP,NP or NP,PP 
after the verb) as that used by the experimenter in her immediate preceding turn describing 
the ditransitive prime.   
 
Theory of mind in dialogue. 
Participants were interviewed after each of the 3 maze games to elicit a speech sample of 
their reflections of their own and the experimenter’s thinking during participation in the task. 
Interviews consisted of questions about their views on both players’ performance during the 
maze game, e.g. “Did we make any mistakes?”, “Do you think I understood what you were 
trying to do to?” To seek participants’ full justification for their answers, responses were 
probed further with scripted WH-questions (who, what, where, why, which) (e.g. “What 
mistakes did we make?”, “What was I trying to do?”). All interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed verbatim for analysis (see supplementary material 4 for examples illustrating how 
these were scored). 
 
Theory of mind stories. 
A set of 6 stories (Frith and Corcoran, 1996) was used to assess ToM ability involving 
explicit reasoning skills assessed in a traditional ToM task. These stories contained first- and 
second-order deception questions and the other three contained first and second-order false 
belief questions. Stories were read aloud to participants, who were also shown cartoons 
simultaneously to facilitate comprehension. After each story, participants were asked one 
memory/reality question (concerning an event in the story) and one question that depended 
on the ability to infer the mental state of one of the characters. The memory control question 
is not a measure of ToM, but serves as a control for understanding and memory of the story, 
from which the participant makes a ToM judgment. Each question type occurred three times 
across the six stories, making a total of 12 questions across the four types.  
 
                                                 
1 Verbs which take an Indirect Object and a Direct Object are known as ditransitive verbs. Intransitive verbs 





Alignment in dialogue (maze task). 
A full description of the system of measuring alignment is reported elsewhere (Garrod and 
Doherty, 1994) plus a discussion in the supplementary material 5. In brief, there was a total 
of 6 description types: Path, matrix, line, figural, comment, goal, and non-descriptions. 
Alignment was scored as the degree that the participants’ descriptions were influenced by the 
experimenters’ descriptions in the previous exchange n-1 (see Garrod and Clark, 1993). We 
calculated the number of participants’ descriptions in each dialogue that matched that of the 
experimenter’s preceding description in the same game. This number was then divided by the 
total number of transitions in the game where the experimenter had provided a preceding 
description to create an alignment score as a percentage.  
Due to the relatively low number of comments, non-description and goal type 
descriptions, scores for these were collapsed into one category labelled ‘other’. A Kruskal-
Wallis test showed no significant difference in the mean number of each description type 
across the three mazes provided by the experimenter for each group; path (H(2)=4.29, 
p=0.12), line (H(2)=0.87, p=0.65), figure (H(2)=3.86, p=0.15), matrix (H(2)=1.04, p=0.6), 
and other (H(2)=0.9, p=0.64). A one-way ANOVA revealed there was no significance 
difference between the groups’ mean total recording times (F(2,63)=3.55,  p=0.13). 
 
- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE - 
 
Theory of mind in dialogue. 
Transcripts were analysed for evidence of ToM through patients’ demonstration of 
representation of their own or others mental states either spontaneously or in response to a 
question (McCabe et al., 2004). Interviews were coded by 2 raters, one blind to group 
membership. Responses from participants that simply provided yes/no answers were not 
counted as evidence of ToM unless justification was provided. The number of references to 
own and other’s beliefs used by participants, was measured according to lexical indices of 
ToM e.g. ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘want’, ‘try’, ‘aim’, realise’ (Stewart et al., 2009). 
Inter-rater reliability between the two scorers on 15 interview scripts showed almost 
perfect agreement for reference to own beliefs (Intra-class correlations (ICC): 0.99) and for 
reference to others’ beliefs (ICC=0.99). 
 
Analyses  
Due to differences between the two patient groups on the NART (pre-morbid IQ), scores for 
this measure were entered as covariates in all analyses, as a sensitive and conservative 
strategy. Because a working memory deficit is well established to be a core feature of 
schizophrenia (see Lee and Park, 2005 for a meta-analysis), and is found to be strongly 
correlated with both language comprehension (Bagner et al., 2003) and language production 
deficits (Cohenet al., 1999; Docherty et al., 1996), scaled scores for Letter Number 
Sequencing span (working memory), arguably the strongest measure of working memory, 
were also entered on all analyses. 
 
To test for differences on degree of alignment in the maze tasks, a 3 (group: FTD vs. non-
FTD vs. healthy control) x 3 (maze: 3 levels) ANCOVA was carried out. The dependent 
variable (DV) was the total score on alignment for each of the three mazes. In the syntactic 
alignment task, only first responses that contained target verbs were included. Data were 
entered into a 3 (group: FTD, non-FTD, HC) x 2 (word order: Direct Object, Indirect Object 
vs. Indirect Object, Direct Object) ANCOVA, with syntactic alignment scores as the DV. To 




deception and false belief mentalising with group as the between-participant factor and order 
as the within-participant factor were carried out with scores from the memory question and 
NART entered as covariates. To test for differences on ToM performance in the interviews, a 
3 (group) x 2 (own belief vs. experimenter’s belief) ANCOVA was carried out. The DV was 
total score on references to own and other’s beliefs indicating ToM. Individual group 
differences were investigated using LSD post-hoc tests. To test for the relationship between 
alignment and ToM, Pearson’s correlations were calculated between total alignment scores 
(separately for the maze and syntax tasks) and ToM scores on own, and others’, beliefs, and 




Alignment in dialogue (the maze task).  
A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was a significant group difference on 
participants’ success on the maze task as measured by the number of successful attempts at 
reaching their destination (F(2,61)=4.4, p <0.05). LSD post hoc analysis showed that there 
was no difference in success rates between the two patient groups (p=0.6), but both FTD and 
non-FTD patients were less successful at task completion than healthy controls (FTD: 
p<0.01; non-FTD: p<0.05). Pearson’s correlations showed there was a significant relationship 
between task success and degree of alignment in the FTD group (r=0.45, p<0.05), but not in 
either the non-FTD group or the healthy controls (r=-0.08, p=0.73) and (r=-0.35, p=0.12) 
respectively. 
In the alignment analysis, as predicted, a main effect of group (F(2,59)=19.33, 
p<0.001) was found (see figure 2). LSD post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences in 
all comparisons: the FTD group produced less alignment than both the non-FTD group 
(p<0.01) and the healthy controls (p<0.001), while the non-FTD group also produced less 
alignment than healthy controls (p<0.01). There was no main effect of maze (F(2,118)=0.11, 
p=0.90) or interaction between maze and group (F(4,118)=0.46, p=0.76). There was no effect 
of working memory (F(1,59)=0.88, p=0.35) or NART pre-morbid IQ (F(1,59)=0.84, p=0.36).   
Cohen’s d between-participant effect sizes demonstrated that on the degree of 
alignment, there were medium effect sizes between the FTD and non-FTD group (d=0.91) 
and the non-FTD group and healthy controls (d=1.06), and a very large effect size between 
the FTD group and healthy controls (d=2.25).  
 
Syntactic alignment.  
As predicted, the two-way ANCOVA for the syntactic alignment task revealed a main effect 
of group (F(2,59)=4.38, p <0.05) (see figure 1). LSD post hoc tests revealed a significant 
difference between the FTD group and healthy controls (p<0.01) with the FTD patients 
showing less alignment. The difference between the FTD group and non-FTD group was not 
significant (p=0.1) and there was no significant difference between the non-FTD patients and 
healthy controls (p<0.16).  There was a trend for an effect of word order (F(1,59)=3.67, 
p=0.06), but no interaction between word order and group (F(2,59)=0.84, p=0.44). There was 
an effect of working memory (F(2,59)=8.7, p<0.01), but no effect of NART (F(2,59)=0.6, 
p=0.46). 
- INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  - 
 
- INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE  - 
 
Theory of mind tasks 




One-way ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between the groups’ mean total 
recording times (F(2,61)=0.01, p=0.99) or mean number of utterances (F(2,61)=0.42 p=0.66). 
As predicted, the 2-way ANCOVA revealed a main effect of group (F(2,59)=4.48, p<0.05) 
on overall ToM scores, but there was no effect of own vs experimenter belief reference 
(F(1,59)=1.93, p=0.17) (see figure 3). Post-hoc LSD tests showed that the healthy controls 
produced more belief references than the FTD group (p<0.01), and, at trend level, than the 
non-FTD group (p=0.06). Unexpectedly, there was no significant difference between the two 
patient groups (p=0.24). There was no interaction between belief reference and group 
(F(2,59)=1.17, p=0.32). There were no effects of working memory (F(1,59)=2.34, p=0.13) or 
pre-morbid IQ (F(1,59)=0.24, p=0.63). Pearson’s correlations showed there was no 
significant relationship between task success and degree of ToM in any of the three groups 
(FTD: r=0.01, p=0.96; non-FTD: r=0.18, p=0.42; healthy controls: r=-0.18, p=0.42). 
 
(INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE) 
 
Theory of mind stories   
A one-way ANOVA revealed a group difference on the memory control task (F(2,61)=4.4, 
p<0.01). Tukey’s LSD post hoc tests revealed no significant difference between the two 
patient groups (p=0.6), who both scored lower than the healthy controls (FTD: p<0.01; non-
FTD group: p=0.03).  
For deception questions, there was a significant main effect of group (F(2,59)=7.65, 
p=0.001) while there was no effect of memory questions (F(1,59)=0.33, p=0.57) and no 
effect of IQ (F(1,59)=0.03, p=0.86). LSD post hoc analysis revealed that the FTD group 
produced fewer accurate responses than both the non-FTD group (p<0.05) and healthy 
controls (p<0.001), as did the non-FTD compared to the healthy controls (p<0.05). There was 
no effect of order (F(1,59)=0.13, p=0.72) and no interaction between order and group 
(F(2,59)=1.13, p=0.33). 
In the false belief stories there was again a main effect of group (F(2,59)=13.02, 
p<0.001) and a significant main effect of the memory questions (F(1,59)=7.16, p=0.01) but 
no effect of (pre-morbid) IQ (F(1, 59)=2.34, p=0.13). LSD post hoc analysis revealed that the 
FTD group performed worse than both the non-FTD group (p<0.05) and healthy controls 
(p<0.001), as did the non-FTD group compared to the healthy controls (p<0.01). There was 
no main effect of order (F(1,59)=0.04, p=0.85) or interaction between order and group 
(F(2,59)=1.12, p=0.33). 
 
Relationship between alignment and theory of mind  
In the FTD group, there were significant relationships between alignment in dialogue and 
both own beliefs (r=0.48, p<0.05) and experimenter’s belief (r=0.44, p<0.05) utterances on 
the maze task, and in the healthy control group for alignment and own belief (r=0.45, 
p<0.05). No other significant correlations for total alignment scores (separately for the maze 
and syntax tasks) and ToM (separately for dialogue or stories) were found. All correlations 




As predicted, we found that FTD patients, compared to both healthy controls and non-FTD 
patients, displayed significantly less alignment with a conversational partner on a common 
lexical and semantic system in their dialogic contributions, and lower level syntactic 
alignment than healthy controls. Differences across groups were independent of pre-morbid 




Referential communication impairments are correlated with poor performance on specific 
neuropsychological measures, including working memory (Docherty and Gordinier, 1999; 
Doherty, 2005) and thus the distinction here may represent differing working memory 
demands for the two tasks. 
Poverty of alignment observed in both patient groups relative to the healthy control 
group can be explained as a failure to utilise the available linguistic context and update their 
own interpretation of the evolving discussion via the production system. This would 
impoverish the ability to make predictions about upcoming structures, as observed in ERP 
studies of contextual processing in schizophrenia (Wang et al., 2011). Moreover, the healthy 
listener’s employment of the production system in comprehension suggests a disruption in 
underlying mechanisms for both input and output processes in FTD. 
While the non-FTD patients also showed a decrement in producing a shared semantic 
and conceptual representation of the maze in comparison to the healthy controls, they did not 
show reduced syntactic alignment. It thus seems unlikely that poverty in alignment at lower 
levels failing to percolate up to the situational models can account for the reduced alignment 
in non-FTD patients in interactive dialogue.  
The non-FTD group’s reduced alignment in dialogue relative to healthy controls may 
reveal subtle weaknesses in the mechanisms underpinning alignment in schizophrenia, which 
are more prominent in FTD. This would support the idea of a continuum of context 
processing deficits in schizophrenia (Kuperberg et al., 2010; Tan and Rossell, 2015).  
Problems of priming at low levels of activation in schizophrenia (see Doughty and Done, 
2009 for a review), may create a tipping point for the manifestation of clinical FTD in the 
context of an imbalance between algorithmic and semantic associative streams of processing 
(Kuperberg, et al., 2010). 
Poor alignment found here may result from difficulty in creating an efference copy 
that feeds into the forward production model. This would result in difficulty in generating 
predictions, as observed in schizophrenia (Wang et al., 2011), and in processing new input as 
it unfolds (Kuperberg and Jaeger, 2015). Alternatively, a problem of monitoring the current 
utterance and the predicted utterance percept would be consistent with the suggestion that 
underlying schizophrenia is a failure to monitor one’s own representations (Frith, 1992), and 
more specifically, of FTD as a failure in self- or error-monitoring (McGrath et al. 1997; Laws 
et al. 1999; Kircher and David, 2003).  
These findings are also consistent with the proposal of FTD as a breakdown in 
generative circuitry within a hierarchical generative framework of language processing 
(Brown and Kuperberg, 2016). These authors argue that a tendency to discount the precision 
of predictions prior to encountering bottom up information leads to an overweighting of 
prediction error along with an over-dependence on bottom-up activity, resulting in an over-
reliance on semantic associations to establish the global structure. This would result in 
reduced alignment as patients’ activation of a much broader set of semantic neighbours when 
new input is encountered.  
 
Theory of Mind: main findings   
Our second hypothesis was that FTD patients would display reduced implicit ToM in online 
communication relative to non-FTD patients and healthy controls. Both patient groups 
demonstrated a decrement in performance on ToM in dialogue relative to healthy controls but 
the difference between the two patient groups did not reach significance. Neither clinical 
group demonstrated an absence of ToM reasoning in dialogue but they did demonstrate a 
relative impairment (see also Stewart et al., 2009; Langdon et al., 1997; Russell et al., 2006). 
In traditional ToM tasks however FTD patients showed significantly poorer performance than 




impoverished explicit and implicit ToM performance, while the non-FTD group displayed 
more impoverished ToM in dialogue only.  
Importantly the two tasks test distinct skills. It is plausible that impoverished 
contextual processing could impact on FTD patients’ ToM abilities in dialogue specifically. 
An inability to collate the contextual information necessary to build up an interpretation of 
the mental states of others (Schenkel, Spaulding & Silverstein, 2005) may create difficulty in 
exploiting linguistic context to construct a representation corresponding to what the speaker 
has said. This in turn may impoverish alignment with the speaker and cause difficulty with 
tailoring communication appropriately to the listener in dialogue. 
 
Theory of Mind and Alignment  
As predicted, a correlation between alignment and ToM in dialogue was robust in the FTD 
group, but not in the non-FTD group, and was only evident for own beliefs in the healthy 
control group. This finding supports the hypothesis that reduced alignment representing 
problems of contextual processing has implications for mentalising. Failure to align linguistic 
representations to converge on a common situation model might create a decrement in the 
contextual scaffolding that facilitates establishing the interlocuter’s mental state in dialogue. 
There was no correlation between ToM as measured by traditional tasks or between syntactic 
alignment and either measure of ToM, potentially reflecting a distinction of mediated and 
unmediated alignment.  
Mediated accounts conceptualize alignment as a more strategic process, whereby 
imitation in conversation is deployed to facilitate communicative success. In contrast to 
syntactic alignment, lexical and semantic alignment observed in the maze task, might be 
supported by additional communicative strategies, i.e. beliefs about the audience. 
Additionally, the FTD group’s performance on ToM in dialogue correlated with alignment in 
dialogue but not with syntactic alignment. Collectively, this suggests that both measures of 
performance in dialogue might capture a more conscious element or ‘communicative design’. 
However, a more mediated role might be expected to be related with working memory 
abilities (Kaschak & Glenberg, 2004), widely reported to be impaired in schizophrenia (Lee 
and Park, 2005), yet there was no effect of working memory in either the alignment in 
dialogue task or in the ToM in dialogue task.  
This pattern of processing in alignment and ToM in FTD might indicate a more 
generalised impairment of contextual processing underlying schizophrenia (Cohen and 
Servan-Schreiber, 1992). This relationship between abnormalities of alignment and ToM can 
also be captured within the hierarchical generative framework (Kuperberg and Jaeger, 2015). 
A failure to take the listener’s feedback into account may, to a large extent, also be implicated 
in abnormal monitoring at other levels of the system in FTD (e.g. Cohen, 1976; 1989; 
MacGrath, 1991). Impaired monitoring of feedback and detection of miscommunication, 
could at least contribute to the failure of communication that characterizes thought disorder. 
 
Limitations  
The researcher’s role meant that the dialogue in the task did not allow entirely natural 
alignment with the participants. For the purpose of achieving experimental control, it was 
however important to use similar input across the three groups. This study has used a 
categorical approach, distinguishing between patients with and without FTD, rather than 
treating FTD as a continuous variable preferred by some researchers. As a strength, we 
recruited a sufficient number of FTD patients with well-matched non-FTD patients and 
ensured thorough clinical and cognitive assessment; moreover, only patients with marked or 




As a consequence however, it was not possible to match all participants on all estimates of 
IQ. 
Conclusion  
This is the first study to investigate contextual processing in FTD in dialogic interactions. 
The findings (the key tasks show a decrement in performance)  show that a decrement in 
sensitivity to contextual influences may underlie patients’ disruption in spontaneous speech, 
given that mechanisms of alignment in dialogue are underpinned by the production system 
(although patient groups performed similarly on syntactic alignment). The non-FTD group’s 
relative impairment supports the continuum view of language functioning in schizophrenia. 
The association between ToM and alignment performance in FTD may indicate a more 
generalised deficit in integrating multiple sources of information into a contextual whole, or a 
consequence of failure to build up a representation of the speaker’s utterance.  This indicates 
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